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ABSTRACT

Laguna Peralta, Ignacio. M.S.E.C.E., Purdue University, Ago 2008. Online Error
Detection for High Data Rate Distributed Applications. Major Professor: Saurabh Bagchi.
Distributed systems comprising interacting services need runtime error detection
to catch errors arising from software bugs, hardware errors, or unexpected operating
conditions. A significant class of detection systems performs detection at the application
level, based on the state of the application. For example, rule-based systems match rules
against the application’s state deduced by the detection system at runtime. Many largescale distributed applications generate a high rate of messages which can overwhelm the
capacity of the detection system. An approach to handle this is sampling, that is,
processing only a fraction of the messages. However, this approach leads to nondeterminism with respect to the detection system’s view of what state the application is
in. This in turn leads to inaccuracies in matching state-based rules causing degradation in
the quality of detection. In this work, we present an approach to select the messages to
sample and process such that the non-determinism is minimized. Next, we present a
Hidden Markov Model-based technique to probabilistically identify which application
states are most likely so that the detection system can perform rule-based detection for
only those states. We demonstrate the techniques in a detection system called Monitor
applied to a Java-based three-tier online banking system. The techniques do not need
application modifications or a priori application model, but do require knowledge of
expected application behavior to come up with the rules. We empirically evaluate
accuracy and precision of detection under different load conditions and compare our
solution with two other state-of-the-art systems: Pinpoint and Convolution algorithm.
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1.

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Failure Detection in Distributed Systems
Increased deployment of high-speed computer networks has made distributed systems
ubiquitous in today’s connected world. The Internet Domain Name System (DNS), ecommerce and online banking systems, Skype, and web services providers such as
Google and Amazon.com, constitutes some examples of the backbone of the IT
infrastructure in the world today. We increasingly face the challenge of failures due to
natural errors and malicious security attacks affecting these systems. Downtime of a
system providing critical services such as in power systems, space flight control, banking
and railways signaling could be catastrophic. It is therefore imperative to build detection
systems that can detect problems with low latency—the time that elapses between the
failure and the detection should be short. Low-latency detection enables diagnosis and
recovery phases to take place before user services are impacted significantly, thus
preventing long system downtime.
There are several challenges to the problem of designing a detection system that can
handle failures in the distributed systems of today. For example, many existing systems
run legacy code, the protocols have hundreds of participants, and systems often have soft
real-time requirements. A common requirement for the detection system is to be
nonintrusive to the observed system. This implies that significant changes to the observed
application or to the environment in which it executes are undesirable. This also rules out
executing heavyweight detectors in the same host as the application’s components. While
it may be possible to devise optimized solutions for individual distributed applications,
such approaches are not very interesting from a research standpoint because of limited
generalizability. Trying to make changes to a particular protocol or application also
requires an in-depth understanding of the code. The application may be closed source, or
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even if open source, adequate expertise to understand and modify the code may not be
readily available.
To address the challenge of being nonintrusive to the observed system, recent work
from several research groups treats the application system’s components as black-box
components, that is, the observed system is viewed as a collection of software
components typically without the source code available and with no (or minimum)
knowledge of their implementation. Normal-behavior models are then built up so that
failure detection and diagnosis is performed by looking at deviations from the models.
For example, in [1] authors propose algorithms to extract component’s response delay
from traces obtained during a training phase while user requests travel thought a
distributed e-commerce application. Faulty components that cause high latency to the
system can be identified by comparing their response delay to those learned when
observing the traces. In techniques like this, measurements needed for detection, such as
component’s response delays, are typically obtained by observing the interaction between
the system’s components which can be in the form of network messages or intra-node
messages. When this is implemented so that no changes to the application are required to
observe massages, the approach is called black-box instrumentation. Examples of
modeling techniques based on black-box instrumentation that can be used for failure
detection are Magpie [2][3] and Pinpoint [4].
In prior work, we have developed Monitor [5], a failure detection system for
distributed applications. Monitor detects failures under the principle of black-box
instrumentation—detection is performed by observing the messages exchanged between
application’s components. Monitor is provided a representation of the application or
protocol behavior using a Finite State Machine (FSM) along with a set of normal
behavior rules. An example of a rule can be that, in a three-tier e-commerce system, if a
request submits a read command to the back-end database server, the command should
complete within an administrator-specified time bound. When observing a message,
Monitor performs two primary tasks. First, it deduces the state of the application and then
performs a state transition in the application’s FSM based on the observed message.
Second, it performs rule matching for pre-specified rules. The rules are stateful rules, so
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that they are associated with a combination of the deduced state and the observed
message. Monitor uses an observer model whereby it does not have any information
about the internal variables of the application’s components at runtime, but only observes
the inter-component interactions. In contrast to [1] where detection is performed offline
by looking at application’s traces, the detection in Monitor is performed in an online
manner as the application executes.
1.2 Scalability Challenges in High Throughput
Failure detection can broadly be classified as stateless detection and stateful
detection. In the former, detection is done on individual messages by matching certain
characteristics of the message, such as finding specific signatures in the payload. A more
powerful approach is the stateful approach, in which the failure detection system builds
up a state related to the application by aggregating multiple messages. Rules are then
applied based on the application’s state; thus on aggregated information rather than
instantaneous information. Monitor follows the characteristics of a stateful rule-based
detection system in which rules characterize normal behavior in the system. Stateful
detection is widely recognized as being more powerful in its detection capability
compared to stateless detection [6][7][8].
Though the merits of stateful detection are well accepted, scaling a stateful detection
system with increasing number of application components, number of users or increasing
data rate is a challenge. This is due to the increased processing load of tracking the
application state and rule matching. The rules can be heavy-duty and can impose high
load for matching. For example, a rule may be used to validate data consistency through
different tables in a database. If an entry in a table is deleted, a consistency check has to
be performed so that all associated entries have been garbage collected. This consumes
significant computing resources. It may be tempting to think that throwing more
computational resources would solve the problem. However, it is desirable to keep the
resource requirements of the fault tolerance infrastructure smaller than that of the actual
application system. Also, it would be advantageous to have the fault tolerance
infrastructure scale up better as the application size increases. Therefore the stateful
detection system has to be designed such that its resource usage is minimized.
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We have observed in prior work [5] that Monitor has a breaking point in terms of the
incoming message rate; beyond this point, its accuracy and latency of detection suffer.
We observe through a testbed experiment that as the incoming packet rate into a single
Monitor is increased beyond 100 packets/sec, Monitor breaks down on a standard Linux
box. In this testbed, Monitor was configured to detect failures in a reliable multicast
protocol called TRAM. The drop in accuracy or rise in latency can be very sharp beyond
the breaking point depending on the exact queuing mechanism employed in Monitor.
Note that all detection systems that fall in this important class of stateful detection, are
expected to have such a breaking point, though the rate of messages at which each system
breaks will be different.
Consider that the processing load on the detection system per unit time is given by
(the number of components being verified) × (the external message rate generated by
each component) × (the processing overhead for each message). We can reduce the
processing load in Monitor by sampling incoming messages, that is, by processing only a
fraction of them. This is complementary to the effort at making the per-message
processing extremely efficient, which we have done and reported in [9]. Based on this
fact, we implemented in prior work a random sampling approach to help Monitor reduce
its workload when experiencing high incoming rates of messages [9]. When Monitor
perceives a rate of incoming messages close to the breaking point, it activates a samplingand-dropping mechanism for incoming messages to reduce the workload of state
transition and rule matching. Messages are sampled randomly without looking at the
content of the message. The sampling rate is such that the rate of messages being
processed is well below the Monitor’s breaking point.
1.3 Main Contributions of this Work
Because Monitor deduces the application’s state based on received messages, when
performing sampling of the messages, Monitor is no longer aware of the exact state the
application is in. This phenomenon is called non-determinism. Monitor builds up a set of
states that represents the possible states the application can be in, given a count of
dropped messages. This causes inaccuracies in selecting the rules to match since the rules
are based on the application state and the observed message. Inaccuracies in the selection
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of the rules to match lead to lower accuracy and precision (false and true positive rates)
for Monitor.
In this work, we focus in reducing the non-determinism and increasing accuracy and
precision of detection when Monitor is performing sampling. We show that the nondeterminism can be bounded to a low value by selecting which messages to sample and
process. This idea arises out of the observation that in an application, a message type can
be seen in the transitions for multiple states within an FSM. For example, a call to the
getCustomerData function to look up customer related information in an e-commerce site
may be made from different components. Different message types differ in their ability to
discriminate the application’s current state, that is, to pinpoint which possible state(s) the
application may be in. Such computation of the discriminative property of the messages
is done offline by analysis of the application’s FSM. At runtime, the Monitor observes all
messages, but selectively samples and processes the messages with a high discriminative
property. We call this technique intelligent sampling.
Even with the proper selection of messages during sampling, there is remaining nondeterminism about the application state. Next, we use a Hidden Markov Model (HMM)based technique to estimate the likelihood of the different application states. The HMM
can answer the question—given a certain sequence of observations, what is the
probability that the application is in any given state. Rule matching is then performed for
a reduced set of states containing only the more likely states. This involves prior training
of the HMM with representative application traces. This is admittedly a challenge but is
nevertheless used in many systems of this genre, for example in [10]. The HMM enables
Monitor to detect anomalies in the structure of request paths in the application, for
example, request paths that results from malfunctioning components.
The two techniques (intelligent sampling and HMM-based estimation of the probable
application states) are applicable to the general class of detection systems that relies on
rule matching based on the application state. We believe that the presented techniques
can make detection systems scale to large-size applications or to applications that exhibit
high rates of messages, with only a small degradation in the detection quality. In this
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work, we incorporate the techniques in the Monitor system and experimentally quantify
the detection quality in terms of accuracy and precision for a range of software errors.
Our experimental application is called Duke’s Bank [11], a medium-size online
banking application running on Glassfish, the open source Sun Application Server.
Glassfish is comprised of a web container, an EJB container, and a back-end database.
When a user request is received in the application server, Monitor observes the sequence
of calls and returns between the application’s components caused by the request. We call
this sequence of calls and returns a web interaction. We inject errors in particular pairs of
the combination (component, method), where component can be a Java jsp, servlet or
Enterprise Java Bean (EJB), and method a function call in the component. The injected
errors can cause failures in the combination (component, method), or in web interactions
in which this combination is touched, for example, by delaying the completion of the web
interaction or by prematurely terminating a web interaction without the expected
response back to the user.
We compare Monitor’s performance with two state-of-the-art detection techniques:
Pinpoint [4] and the Convolution algorithm from [1]. Pinpoint can detect anomalies in
the structure of web interactions, while Convolution can determine unusually long delays
in interactions between multiple components. While evaluating these three systems, we
create a load that is imposed to the Duke’s Bank by varying the number of concurrent
users. We show that Monitor has a comparable accuracy to Pinpoint but a better precision
when detecting anomalies in web interactions. We do not have final results in the
comparison with Convolution algorithm (since its implementation is still in progress), but
preliminary results show that accuracy and precision in Monitor is superior to that of
Convolution. Monitor outperforms Pinpoint in terms of latency of detection by providing
an average latency in the order of milliseconds while Pinpoint shows an average in the
order of seconds.
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2.

BACKGROUND

In previous work, we developed Monitor, a framework for detecting errors in
distributed applications [5]. Monitor is said to verify the application’s components by
observing the messages exchanged between the components through the communication
channel. Monitor uses the observed messages and an application’s FSM to deduce the
state of the application. Next, pre-specified rules in a rulebase are used to verify
correctness of the behavior based on the FSM. The rules can be either derived from the
application specification (e.g., a protocol specification) or specified by the system
administrator (e.g., constraints to meet QoS requirements).
The major futures and advantages of Monitor can be depicted as follows. First,
Monitor performs detection through black-box instrumentation, that is, the application
being verified does not have to be changed to allow Monitor detects errors—only
exchanged messages are observed in the application’s components, but not the internal
variables of the application. This permit error detection to be carried out in an online
manner, allowing faster detection latency as compared to offline approaches. Since
Monitor operates asynchronously to the verified application, it does not become a
performance bottleneck in the application. Second, a hierarchical structure has been
implemented so that Monitor scales with large number of components or application
entities located in different locations in the network. Third, Monitor is applicable to a
large class of applications with minimal effort in moving from one application to another.
This is achieved by keeping Monitor architecture application neutral and the rulebase
specified in an intuitive formalism that can be used for detection of failures in different
applications. Also the set of detectable errors can be extended in a modular manner
without changes to either the application or the Monitor’s algorithms. Finally, Monitor
ought to have a low latency of detection since high latency will make any subsequent
diagnosis, containment, or recovery complicated.
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2.1 Fault Model
Monitor can detect any error that manifests itself as a deviation from the application’s
model and expected behavior that are given as input—a Finite State Machine (FSM) and
a set of application-level normal-behavior rules. This is performed in Monitor without
looking at the internal application variables and states. In the context of component-based
web applications, an FSM is used to pinpoint deviations or anomalies in the structure of
the observed web interactions, while rules are used to determine deviations from the
expected normal behavior of application’s components. A fault in an application
component, for example a performance problem, can be manifested in a web interaction
through a delayed response to a client request.
In Monitor, error detection can help in diagnosis because rules can be applied at the
level of methods (or function calls) in components—a finer granularity than detecting an
error in an entire web interaction or only a component.
2.2 Stateful Detection
Monitor is provided a representation of the application behavior through an FSM that
can be generated from a human-specified description (e.g., a protocol specification), or
from analysis of application observations (e.g., function call traces). (An example of a
recent technique to deriving the logic of low-level programs through an FSM has been
proposed in [12].) In our current system, we analyzed sequences of function calls
obtained in application traces to derive a simple message-driven FSM. In addition, rules
provided to Monitor can be derived from the application specification or specified from
quality-of-service conditions required by the application’s administrator. We explain in
detail rule types and syntax in subsection 2.4.
When observing an application component’s message, Monitor performs two primary
tasks. First, it performs a state transition according to the FSM and the observed message.
This allows Monitor to infer the current state of the application. Second, it matches rules
associated to the particular state of the application and the observed message. If it is
determined that the application does not satisfy a rule, an alarm is signaled.
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Monitor

HMM
Packets

Intelligent
Sampling
Random
Sampling

Rules’
Database

FSM’s
Database

Packet Capturer
Engine
µ
msg

State
Maintainer
Engine

ω

Rule
Matching
Engine

Alarms

Fig. 2.1. Monitor architecture. One-sided and two-sided arrows show unidirectional and
bidirectional flow of information respectively. Grey boxes indicate new components
added to Monitor in this work
Monitor architecture consists of three primary threads as shown in Fig. 2.1: the
PacketCapturer engine, the StateMaintainer engine, and the RuleMatching engine. Other
components of the Monitor architecture are described in [5]—in this work we only
explain the necessary components to present our novel ideas.
The PacketCapturer engine is in charge of “capturing” the messages exchanged
between the application components. When Monitor receives a rate of incoming
messages close to the maximum rate that it can handle, the PacketCapturer is responsible
for activating a sampling-and-dropping mechanism to reduce the workload of state
transition and rule matching. In previous work [9] we showed that a random sampling
approach helps in reducing Monitor’s workload when experiencing high incoming rates
of messages. In random sampling, messages are sampled randomly without looking at the
content of the message—this approach is agnostic to the type of messages coming in,
which prevents Monitor having to decide which message to drop or to keep. In [5] we
have showed that under non-sampling conditions, Monitor’s accuracy and precision
suffers when the rate of incoming messages reaches a particular point which is denoted as
Rth. Therefore, random sampling is activated at any rate R close or > Rth, in which
Monitor drops messages uniformly with a rate of one every (R / (R − Rth) ) messages.
The two gray boxes in Fig. 2.1, a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) and an intelligent
sampling algorithm, correspond to the two new components we incorporate in Monitor as
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part of this work. We will explain the functionality of these two blocks later in section 3
and 4 respectively.
Captured messages are passed to the StateMaintainer engine in order to perform state
transitions according to the application’s FSM. For each received message, the
StateMaintainer engine is in charge of producing a representation of the application state
which we call the state vector and it is represented by ω. When Monitor is in nonsampling mode, the state vector contains typically only one state—Monitor has an
almost-complete view of the events generated in the application, therefore it can infer the
actual application’s state. However, when sampling mode is activated, Monitor loses
track of the actual state of the application since it is not observing every event (or
message) generated by the application. In this scenario, ω ends up with a set of the
possible states in which the application can be in, given the number of dropped messages.
Once a message mi is sampled, ω is updated according to the states in ω and mi. This is
performed by observing (in the FSM) the new state (or states) to where the application
could has been moved, from each state in ω given mi. We call this mechanism pruning of
the state vector and it is explained in more detail in subsection 3.1. Typically, when ω is
pruned, its size is reduced, or tends to be 1, since in reality the application can only be in
one state. However, for particular FSMs, pruning ω can increase its size, for example,
when mi appears in transitions to different states in the FSM, and initial states of these
transitions are elements of ω.
The RuleMatching engine is responsible for obtaining the current (and pruned) state
vector ω from the StateMaintainer engine and matching rules associated with the state(s)
in ω. If the application is found to violate any of the rules, alarms are generated
indicating that a problem exists in the application, so further actions can be taken—a
diagnosis phase can be triggered either in Monitor or in a separate system in order to
detect the root cause of the problem.
A challenge in Monitor when performing random sampling is to maintain high levels
of accuracy and precision of detection while dropping messages, that is, while the view of
the generated application’s events is reduced. In Monitor, stateful detection is performed
by matching normal-behavior rules per state; therefore, the degraded view of the
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application’s state caused by random sampling affects directly its quality of detection.
Typically two cases can illustrate this degradation when ω is produced through any
sampling mechanism. First, if ω does not contain the correct application’s state Si, and a
failure occurs in Si, we will have a missed alarm since no rules will be applied to Si. This
leads to a reduction in accuracy. Second, if ω contains a large number of incorrect
states—states where the application is not in—false alarms can be triggered leading to a
reduction in precision. We have observed that due to the randomness of the sampling
approach proposed in [9], these two cases can take place frequently enough to take down
quality

of

detection

to

non-acceptable

ranges.

For

example,

in

[9]

we obtained a maximum accuracy of 0.7 when detecting failures in TRAM, a reliable
multicast protocol. Systems running critical services can demand higher levels of
accuracy and lower detection latency.
2.3 Building FSM from Traces
Monitor uses a stateful model (an FSM) for rule matching by preserving the state of
the application across the received messages. This FSM is typically obtained from the
protocol or application specification and it is given to Monitor as an input. However, we
want our techniques to be applicable to a broader spectrum of systems, that is, systems in
which the source code is not available and in which there is no knowledge of the internal
behavior of components. For this purpose, an FSM of the Duke’s Bank Application is
built by obtaining traces from the application and observing the interaction between
components, that is, their calls and returns between component’s methods.
When we generate application’s traces, no error injection is performed and we
assume that the application is free of faults. This has also been assumed when performing
training in other detection techniques such as in Pinpoint [4], our point of comparison in
this work. A disadvantage of this assumption is that Monitor is not able to detect design
faults that are not manifested as failures when obtaining the traces. However, if an FSM
is provided from the application or protocol specifications, this problem is not present.
A state Si in the FSM is defined as a tuple (component, method) where component is
an Enterprise Java Bean (EJB), a servlet or a jsp web component, and method is a Java
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method within the component. In the rest of the paper we use the term subcomponent to
denote the tuple (component, method). The aim for this level of granularity is to be able
to pinpoint performance problems or errors in particular methods, rather than only in
components.
The FSM is represented as a state transition diagram, in which a transition from a
state Si to another state Sj is enabled when a condition is satisfied. For example,
(AccountControllerBean, getDetails) and (AccountControllerBean, find) constitutes two
different states in our FSM, although they represent two methods in the same component
(or class). A condition for a state change is defined as a call or return event, that is, the
event that either subcomponent i has called subcomponent j, or subcomponent i has
returned from subcomponent j. Hence, if for example find is called from
AccountControllerBean, Monitor executes a state transition and updates the current state
vector.
The FSM for the application is obtained by observing the calls and returns between
components from traces collected when the application is exercised with a given
workload. We define a profile as a set of operations that a web user performs in the
application such as listing account histories, transferring funds between accounts, or
withdrawing funds. When imposing the workload to the Duke’s Bank application for
generating the FSM, we try to be as exhaustive as possible in the profiles, so that all the
possible web interactions are executed. This is a critical step when generating the FSM,
because failing to execute some of the web interactions can render an incomplete FSM.
Our FSM is composed of a total of 31 states and 62 events (two times 31 because of
the calls and returns). The initial and final states of the FSM are the same and represent
the state when a web interaction request is received by the server and when it is replied to
the client respectively.
2.4 Rule Types and Syntax
In our previous work [5] we developed syntax for rule specification that can be
applied in message-based applications. We now have extended the rule syntax to be more
flexible so that they can be applied more naturally to RPC-style component-based
applications.
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For detecting performance problems in distributed applications, we use a set of
temporal rules that characterize allowable response time of subcomponents. The
following are examples by which response time can be derived to come up with temporal
rules in Monitor: (1) a protocol specification may specify that an entity i should
acknowledge or reply a request made from entity j in a bounded interval of time, (2) a
Service Level Agreement (SLA) may specify QoS constraints for Web service
components when delivered to specific users [13]—since subcomponents can be seen as
service providers to other subcomponents, Monitor’s temporal rules can be used to verify
their expected response time, (3) models based on performance analysis tools, such as
Magpie, can be used to derive normal response time of elements in three-tier applications
such as e-commerce and online banking applications.

1 Type1 (/atmAck.jsp,service) 0 0
(/atmAck.jsp,service) 0 100
2 Type2 (TxControllerBean,transferFunds) 0 75
3 Type2 (/accountList.jsp,service) 0 50
...
...

Fig. 2.2. Example of rules that are given to Monitor for verifying Duke’s Bank
Application behavior
Our rule syntax is able to specify response time lower and upper bounds at the
granularity of function calls within a component. We explain two types of rules that can
be applied directly to RPC-style applications—other types of rules that Monitor is able to
handle, for example, rules for message-based applications, can be found in [5]:
1.Type 1: (Si) for T ∈ (tN, tN + k) ⇒ (Sj) for T ∈ (tM, tM + l), where tM > tN, and k, l ≥
0.
Explanation: This rule represents the fact that, if for some time interval T ≤ k
starting at tN, application is in state Si, it should move to state Sj for some time
interval T ≤ l starting at time tM.
Purpose: This rule serves to verify the time elapsed in a nested call of different
subcomponents. Line 1 in Fig. 2.2 shows an example of this rule. If subcomponent
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(/atmAck.jsp, service) calls another subcomponent which then calls another one—
generating a sequence of calls—this example shows that we expect that a return
should go to (/atmAck.jsp, service) in no more than 100 milliseconds. We can use
this rule to model the maximum amount of time that a web interaction can take if
state 0 is used in Si and Sj.
2.Type 2: (Si) for T ∈ (tN, tN + k).
Explanation: This rule represents the fact that given the rule is instantiated at time
t=0, the application must be in state Si for some time within tN and tN+k. This gives
that the minimum and maximum time the application must stay in the state are tN
and tN+k.
Purpose: this rule serves to verify the minimum and maximum allowable response
time of a subcomponent. Second and Third line in Fig. 2.2 show examples of these
rules. In Line 2 we verify that (TxcontrollerBean, transferFunds) subcomponent
responds in no more than 75 milliseconds, whereas in line 3 we say that
(/accountList.jsp, service) should respond in no more than 50 milliseconds.
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3. HANDLING HIGH STREAMING RATES: INTELLIGENT
SAMPLING
3.1 Sampling in Monitor
With an increase in the incoming message rate at Monitor, the latency of detection
can increase. In order to maintain an acceptable given latency, Monitor cannot afford
processing all the messages coming at a high rate—processing all the messages has a
high cost in terms of computation. To avoid being overwhelmed with the high
computational cost, Monitor chooses to process only a fraction of the incoming messages.
In our previous work [9], we present a scheme for randomly sampling a message out of m
messages in order to reduce the computational workload in Monitor.
Sampling a message means that the message is consumed in Monitor for further rule
matching. When a message arrives at the PacketCapturer engine, a sampling mechanism
is used to decide whether to pass the message to the StateMaintainer or not, i.e., whether
to drop the message or not. Therefore, if a message is sampled, it will be consumed by
the StateMaintainer to prune the state vector, and consumed by the RuleMatching engine
for rule matching.
When a message is dropped, Monitor cannot perform state transitions in the FSM,
losing track of the actual state of the application. In this scenario, Monitor opts to
maintain a set of possible states that the application could have reached. The fact that
Monitor does not know the correct application’s state is called state non-determinism.
When sampling, depending on the number of consecutive dropped messages, the state
vector can grow to a maximum of the total possible states in the FSM. As an example,
consider a part of an FSM in Fig. 3.1. Suppose that the application is in state A at time t1,
and that a message is dropped. From the FSM, Monitor determines that the application
can be in state B or state C, so the state vector ω = { SB, SC }. If another message is
dropped at time t2, the state vector grows to ω = { SB, SD, SE, SF }.
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Fig. 3.1. A portion of a Finite State Machine.
Monitor’s RuleMatching engine matches rules for all the states in ω once it is passed
by the StateMantainer engine. To avoid matching rules in incorrect states, Monitor prunes
invalid states from the state vector once a message is sampled. For example, if the current
state vector is { SB, SC } and message m2 is sampled, the state vector is reduced to {SB}
because this is the only possible transition from any state in the state vector given the
event m2 assuming that the sampled message is not erroneous.
A large state vector increases the computational cost in the StateMaintainer and
RuleMatching engines leading to increased detection latency. Even worse, a large and
inaccurate state vector degrades the quality of detection through increase false alarms and
missed alarms. A challenge is then to keep the state vector size bounded so that Monitor
performs detection only corresponding to the correct application state.
3.2 Intelligent Sampling Approach
We hypothesize that sampling based on some inherent property from the FSM can
lead to reducing the state vector size when pruning. We have observed that messages in
the application have different properties in the FSM. For example, some messages can
appear in different transitions while other appears in only one. Suppose for example that
state vector ω = { SB, SC } following Fig. 3.1. If m3 is sampled, StateMaintainer would
prune ω to { SD }, while if m4 is sampled, ω would be pruned to { SE, SF }. As we can see,
the fact that m3 appears in one transition while m4 appears in two ones makes a difference
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in the resulting state vector. We say therefore that m3 has a more desired property than m4
in terms of sampling.
We propose an intelligent sampling approach whereby the incoming packets are
observed, and a message with a desirable property is sampled. A packet is observed by
determining the type of message it represents in the application. In network protocols,
this can be performed by observing the header and payload of the packet, while in RCPstyle applications this can be performed by observing the payload only. Let us denote by
dm, discriminative size, the number of times a message m appears as a state transition in
the FSM. We say that in our intelligent sampling approach, a message with a small dm is
desired.
The procedure of selecting a message with a desirable property in a window of m
messages is implemented in Monitor though a greedy algorithm. The details of the
algorithm are explained in the next subsection.
3.3 Intelligent Sampling Algorithm
To guarantee that the rate of messages processed by Monitor is less than Rth, it samples n
messages in a window of m messages. Now, given a window of m messages, which
particular messages should Monitor sample? Ideally, Monitor should wait for n messages
with a discriminative size less than a particular threshold dth. However, since we do not
know in advanced what the next message would be, Monitor could end up with no
sampled messages at all by the end of the window if no messages with dm < dth arrive. To
address this, Monitor tracks the number of messages seen in the window and the number
of messages already sampled in counters numMsgs and numSampled respectively. If
Monitor reaches a point where the number of remaining messages in the window (m −
numMsgs) is equal to the number of messages that it still needs to sample (n −
numSampled), all the remaining messages (m − numMsgs) are sampled without looking at
their discriminative sizes. We call this point the last resort point.
Fig. 3.2 shows the algorithm ChooseMessageIntelligently for intelligent
sampling. Since this algorithm runs for a window of m messages, a main while loop in
lines 5-16 is maintained to guarantee that only m messages are examined for every run,
while the condition in line 6 guarantees that only n messages are sampled. If the last
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resort point is never reached (e.g., the desired messages arrive early in the window), the
algorithm runs always lines 7-11. Here discriminative size of messages is examined to
sample the desired ones. Otherwise, as a result of reaching the last resort point, it runs
lines 12-14. Notice that in lines 7-11, each message is looked in a pre-computed static
table which has the dm for all the messages in the FSM. If a message is seen to have a dm
< dth, it is sampled.
ChooseMessageIntelligently decides whether to sample or drop a
message in a window of messages.
Input:
n: the number of messages that have to be sampled
m: size of the window of messages from which we sample n
messages
table: table with each message and its corresponding
discriminating size
dth: threshold for the discriminative size of a message
Variables: currentMsg: current captured message
numMsgs: number of messages seen in m
numSampled: number of sampled messages
size: discriminative size of a message
ChooseMessageIntelligently(n, m, table, dth):
1. currentMsg ← getNextMessage( )
2. numMsgs ← 0
3. numSampled ← 0
4. size ← 0
5. while (numMsgs < m) then
6. if ( numSampled < n ) then
7.
if ( n – numSampled < m – numMsgs ) then
8.
size ← discriminativeSize(currentMsg)
9.
if ( size < dth in table) then
10.
SampleMessage(currentMsg)
11.
numSampled ← numSampled + 1
12.
else then
13.
SampleMessage (currentMsg)
14.
numSampled ← numSampled + 1
15. currentMsg ← getNextMessage( )
16. numMsgs ← numMsgs + 1
17. return

Fig. 3.2. Pseudo-code for sampling message in a window.
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The function getNextMessage( ) captures the next message from the wire. The
function SampleMessage( ) passes the message to the StateMaintainer for further pruning
of the state vector.
For a given window of m messages, the computational cost of this algorithm is
O(K·m), where K is the cost of looking for the discriminative size of a message in table.
We implemented table by using a hash-table so the expected time of this search is O(1),
allowing an overall complexity that tends to O(m).

20

4. REDUCING NON-DETERMINISM: HMM-BASED STATE
VECTOR REDUCTION
There are two major disadvantages when pruning the state vector even with the
intelligent sampling approach. First, when a message is sampled using intelligent
sampling and the state vector is pruned, the size of the new state vector can still be large
making detection costly and inaccurate. This situation arises if the FSM has a large
number of states and if the FSM is completely connected (or close to it). The second
disadvantage is that if the sampled message is incorrect, Monitor can end up with an
incorrect state vector—a state vector that does not contain the actual application’s state.
An incorrect message is one that is valid according to the FSM, but is incorrect given the
current state. For example, in Fig. 3.1, if state vector ω = { SB, SC }, only messages m2, m3
and m4 are correct messages. Incorrect messages can be seen due to a faulty component,
for example, a component that makes an unexpected call to another component as a resort
to mask an error.
In order to overcome these difficulties, we propose the use of a Hidden Markov
Model to determine probabilistically the current state of the application.
4.1 Hidden Markov Model
A Hidden Markov Model (HMM) is an extension of a Markov Model where the states
in the model are not observable. In a particular state, an outcome or observation can be
generated according to an associated probability distribution. In contrast to a regular
Markov Model where states are directly visible to the observer, in an HMM, only the
observations are visible; states are hidden to the outside, hence the name Hidden Markov
Model.
The main challenge of Monitor when handling non-determinism is to determine the
correct state of the application when only a partial set of the occurred events is observed,
that is, a partial set of messages is sampled. This phenomenon can be modeled with an
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HMM because, from the perspective of Monitor, the correct state of the application is
hidden when one or more messages are dropped. Therefore, we propose the use of an
HMM to determine the probability of the application being in each of a set of states. In a
subsequent stage, states with probability values below a threshold will be pruned from the
state vector.
An HMM can be characterized by the following [14]:
1. S = {s1, s2,…, sN}, the set of N states in the model. A particular state at time t is
denoted by qt.
2. V = {v1, v2,…, vM}, the vocabulary of M distinct observation symbols, where vi, i
= {1,2,…, M} is an individual symbol. We denote an observation sequence O =
{O1,O2,…,OT}, where each observation Ot is one of the symbols from V, and T is
the number of observations in the sequence.
3. The state transition probability distribution A = {aij}, where
aij = P(qt+1 = sj | qt = si),
1 ≤ i ≤ N, 1 ≤ j ≤ N; t = 1, 2,…
4. The observation probability distribution in state j, B = {bj(k)}, where
bj(k) = P(vk at t | qt = sj),
1 ≤ j ≤ N, 1 ≤ k ≤ M
5. The initial state probability distribution π = {πi}, where
πi = P(q1 = si), 1 ≤ i ≤ N.
We use λ = (A, B, π) as a compact notation for the HMM as proposed in [14].
4.2 HMM Model Parameter Estimation and Training
We used the Baum-Welch algorithm [14] to estimate the HMM parameters in order to
model the Duke’s bank application. The HMM is trained with a set of traces from the
application which is obtained by imposing a load of users for about 5 minutes. These are
the same set of traces used to build our application’s FSM. In generating the load, we
tried to be as exhaustive as possible to produce a complete list of all the web interactions
that can occur in the application.
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When training the HMM, the Baum-Welch algorithm is run with an initial estimate of
HMM parameters, A, B and π. Initial state probability distribution is considered to be
uniform, that is, if there are N states then the initial probability of each state is 1/N.
Uniform distribution is assumed for the transition probabilities for all the edges outgoing
from any state. (Edges that do not appear as a transition in the model have an initial
probability of zero.)
4.3 Algorithm for Reducing the State Vector using HMM
We have implemented the ReduceStateVector algorithm for reducing the state
vector with the HMM. When sampling a message, and before pruning the state vector,
Monitor asks to the HMM for the k most probable application’s states. Monitor then
updates the current state vector by taking the states in common with the HMM’s answer.
Then the state vector is finally pruned according to the sampled message. Fig. 4.1 shows
the pseudo-code for the algorithm which we now explain in detail.
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ReduceStateVector computes a new state vector based on the HMM, an
observation sequence and a previous state vector.
Input:

λ: Hidden Markov Model
O: observation sequence O = {O1, O2,…,Ot}
ωt: application’s state vector at time t
k: Filtering criteria for the number of probabilities estimated by the
HMM (this is the minimum size for the new state vector ωt+1)

Output:

new state vector ωt+1

Variables: µt: probability vector µt = {p1, p2,…,pN},
where pi = P( qt = si | O, λ ), for all i in S (the states in the model)
αt: sorted µt
ReduceStateVector(λ, O, ωt, k):
1. µt ← ∅
2. For each i in S
3.
Add P( qt = si | O, λ ) to µt
4. αt ← sort(µt) by pi
5. I ← ∅
6. I ← ωt ∩ αt[1…k]
7. if ( I = ∅ ) then
8.
ωt+1 ← ωt ∪ αt[1…k]
9. else
10.
ωt+1 ← I
11. return ωt+1

Fig. 4.1. Pseudo-code for the reduction of the state vector with the HMM.
Discrete
Times
..
.
t11

Operations in Monitor
(sampled messages)
Dropped message
ωt10 ← ReduceStateVector(λ, O, ω10, k)
ωt11 is generated from ωt10

..
.
t15

Dropped message
ωt14 ← ReduceStateVector(λ, O, ω14, k)
ωt15 is generated from ωt14

t16

m16 is sampled
ωt15 ← ReduceStateVector(λ, O, ω15, k)
ωt16 is pruned from ωt14 given m16
Time

Fig. 4.2. Points in time when the ReduceStateVector algorithm is invoked. Each discrete
time represents the time when a messages arrives to Monitor.
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The ReduceStateVector algorithm consists of three steps:
Step 1—Calculate the probabilities of the application being in a state si for all the
possible states. Here we ask to the HMM: What is the probability that, after seeing a
sequence of messages, the application is in state s1, s2,…, sN? This is expressed as
P( qt = si | O, λ ), where O is the sequence of messages until a message is sampled, and λ
is the HMM. The maximum size of the sequence O will be the maximum size of a web
interaction in terms of the number of messages. This step produces a vector of
probabilities µt and it is executed within lines 1−3 in the pseudo-code.
Step 2—Sort the vector µt by the probability value of each element. This is done
because we want to determine the most likely state of the application from the HMM
answer, and because µt contains the probabilities for all the states. This step produces a
new vector of probabilities αt and it is executed in line 4.
Step 3—Compute an updated state vector ωt+1 by calculating the intersection of the
current state vector ωt and the top n elements in αt. By using a small n, Monitor is able to
reduce the state vector to few states. For example, taking the example in Fig. 3.1, if ωt = {
SB, SD, SE, SF } and αt = [ SD, SE,…, SA ], by taking the top n=2 in αt the new state vector
ωt+1 would be { SD, SE }. Notice that if the intersection of ωt and αt is null, we take the
union of the two sets. This is a mechanism to reduce the non-determinism produced by
pruning the state vector deterministically with an incorrect message. Having the
intersection of ωt and αt equal to null implies that either the HMM or ωt is incorrect.
Therefore taking the union is a safe way to go. This step is executed within lines 5-11.
The time complexity of the algorithm is proportional to the time in computing µt, that
is, the probabilities P( qt = si | O, λ ) for all the states, the time to sort the array µt, and the
time to compute the intersection of ωt and the top n elements in αt. The vector µt can be
computed in time O(N3⋅T), where N is the number of states in the HMM (and the FSM),
and T is the length of the observation sequence O. Sorting µt can be performed in O(N log
N), and the intersection of ωt and αt[1…n] can be performed in O(N⋅n). Hence, the
overall time complexity is O(N3⋅T + N log N + N⋅n). In practice, the last factor, N⋅n, tends
to be N because we select a small value for n, such as 1 or 2.
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A disadvantage of this algorithm is that an application represented with an FMS
composed of a large number of states can make expensive the use of the algorithm.
However, for the Duke’s Bank application we have an FSM of 62 states which makes this
algorithm computationally feasible. Even when our HMM takes as input complete
sequences of messages, that is, no messages are dropped for the HMM, the computational
cost of this is less expensive than sampling all the messages, that is, processing them all
through the StateMaintainer and RuleMatching engine.
The schematic in Fig. 4.2 presents points in time when the algorithm is invoked in the
StateMaintainer. Notice that when a state vector is generated according to the figure it
represents that it has been updated given the states in the previous state vector and that a
message has been dropped.
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5. EXPERIMENTAL TESTBED
We implement our new algorithms—intelligent sampling and HMM-based state
vector reduction—in the context of the Monitor detection system. We test Monitor’s
performance for detecting errors in the Duke’s Bank application, and compare it to two
state-of-the-art detection schemes: the Convolution algorithm and Pinpoint. In this
section we explain the main implementation details of Convolution and Pinpoint, and the
tools that are used to test the three systems in a real operating scenario.
5.1 J2EE Application
We use the Duke’s Bank Application as the testbed for injecting and detecting errors
in a distributed environment. Duke’s Bank provides administrative functionalities such as
managing customers and accounts, and user functionalities such as accessing account’s
information and performing transactions. This application is representative of a mediumsized component-based application since it is composed of 4 web components (servlets
and Java Server Pages) and 6 Enterprise Java Beans (EJB) components. The Duke’s Bank
application is presented in the J2EE Tutorial [11] and it is meant to demonstrate the
functionality of the typical types of components encountered in e-commerce applications
such as web components, EJB components and application clients.
5.2 Tracing in the J2EE System
Duke’s Bank is run on Glassfish v2 [15], the open-source application server from Sun
Microsystems. Glassfish provides the capability of collecting runtime information for
each web interaction through the CallFlow monitoring system. The CallFlow package
permits the gathering of runtime information for each web interaction as it flows through
the containers in the application server. We use the AsyncHandlerProducer class in
CallFlow to obtain the following runtime information: Request-ID (a key that identifies
each web interaction), the caller and called component, the caller and called method, and
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a timestamp for each web interaction. This mechanism requires no application change
and is less intrusive with respect to runtime overhead.
We use Request-ID to separate concurrent requests in the application. For each
request that arrives to the web server, we create a web interaction that is composed of
messages of the form <(Request-ID), (timestamp), (caller component, method), (called
component, method)>. This level of granularity permits Monitor to detect problems not
only at the level of web interactions, but also at the level of subcomponents.
5.3 Web-users Emulator
In order to evaluate our solutions in diverse scenarios such as high user requests rates
and multiple types of errors, we wrote WebStressor, a trace-based web-users emulator.
WebStressor emulates web interactions that are produced when the application is
experiencing different user loads. WebStressor takes different profile’s traces (obtained
when building the FSM), and replays them by sending each message in the trace to the
tested detection systems—Monitor, Convolution and Pinpoint—through datagram
packets. Each profile’s trace contains a sequence of web interactions that would be seen
in CallFlow when a user of Duke’s Bank application is executing multiple operations.
We use a parameterized uniform random delay between web interactions to emulate the
user think-time.
WebStressor can mimic n concurrent users performing operations on the application.
Its configuration parameters are: the number of concurrent users, the think-time and the
ramp-up delay (the time between two successive users start to interact with the system).
For all the experiments presented in the next section, we wanted to create a specific
number of users at a fast rate and impose a high stressing load on the detection systems.
Therefore, we used a random think-time between 1 and 5 seconds and a ramp-up delay of
200 milliseconds, which are relatively small values compared to say the TPC-W
benchmark runs.
WebStressor also has error injection capabilities. It can mimic the injection of
different kinds of errors in subcomponents in web interactions. These kinds of errors will
be explained in Section 6.4.

28
5.4 Convolution Algorithm Implementation
The implementation of the Convolution algorithm (as presented in [1]) is still in
progress and it is being done by another member of our research group; however, we use
it as a point of comparison for Monitor in detecting performance failures. The
convolution algorithm models delays at each component in the system using signal
processing techniques. We devise a detection scheme from this algorithm and are
implementing it in an online detection system to compare it with Monitor. We call this
implementation Convolution in the rest of the paper. More details of the algorithm can be
found in [1].
5.5 Pinpoint Implementation
Pinpoint [4] constitutes another point of comparison for Monitor in detecting
anomalies in web interactions. Pinpoint proposes an approach for tracing paths from user
requests and the use of a Probabilistic Context Free Grammar (PCFG) to detect failures in
distributed applications. A PCFG is used to model normal path behavior and to detect
anomalies whenever a path’s structure does not fit the PCFG. (In contrast to Convolution,
the implementation of Pinpoint has been completed and has been done by another
member of the research group.)
A PCFG is a model typically used in natural language processing. It models the
likelihood of a sentence based on a set of sentences used for training. In the context of
our application, a sentence can be viewed as the method invocations and returns in a web
interaction. A PCFG consists of a context free grammar (CFG) represented in Chomsky
Normal form in which each production is assigned a probability after a training phase. As
proposed in [4], we implement Pinpoint by using a PCFG to detect anomalies in web
interactions. We call this implementation Pinpoint-PCFG in the rest of the paper.
We first generate a CFG in Chomsky-Normal Form automatically from the FSM. To
explain how we build the CFG, consider a portion of a sample FSM in Fig. 5.1. For each
edge in this FSM, we add two productions of the form SB → SDB SC and SDB → m1,
where SB, SC and SDB are non-terminals and m1 is terminal in the grammar. For the return
edge m4, we add an additional production SB→m4. All productions in CFG are of the
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form NT → NT NT and NT → T, where NT denotes a non-terminal and T denotes a
terminal.

calls
m1
SA

m2
SB

m4

SC
m3

returns

Fig. 5.1. A portion of a sample FSM representing the sequence of calls and returns for a
particular web interaction.
Pinpoint-PCFG has a training phase and a testing phase (the online detection phase).
Pinpoint-PCFG is trained using the same traces taken from Duke’s Bank to build the
FSM and to train the HMM in Monitor. We use the implementation of Inside-Outside
Algorithm (IO) from Brown University [16] for the estimation of the production
probabilities to generate a stochastic context free grammar. The IO Algorithm requires a
context-free grammar and training sequence to determine the production probabilities.
The online part for the detection of failures by Pinpoint-PCFG is implemented by a
statistical parser. We use Cocke-Younger-Kasami (CYK) parser algorithm to parse the
sequence of messages received by Pinpoint-PCFG in a web interaction. We use the
probabilistic CYK parser from Brown University [16] to determine the probability of
deriving a web interaction.
The probability of deriving a web interaction j from Pinpoint-PCFG is the product of
the probabilities of productions used in the derivation. In our implementation, we apply a
transformation to the raw probabilities to be able to work with small probability values.
Let the web interaction j be derived through n productions and probability of production i
given by the CYK parser be pi. We calculate a measure Mj for the web interaction j by the
following equation:
n

M j = − log ∏ pi .
i =1
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Note that, the higher the value of Mj for a web interaction seen, the lower is the
probability of seeing that web interaction according to the PCFG model.
Pinpoint-PCFG’s detection algorithm is a threshold-based algorithm. We compute M
for each web interaction encountered and compare it to a threshold (Mth); if Mj is greater
then Mth, the interaction is marked as anomalous. In our experiments, Mth is an adjustable
parameter.
One advantage of a PCFG, as pointed out in [4], is that it can detect some patterns
that were not seen in the training phase. Since the grammar is context-free, the PCFG
represents a super-set of the observed web interactions seen in the traces used for
training.
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6.

EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS

In this section we report experiments and results for comparing the performance of
Monitor, Convolution and Pinpoint-PCFG in detecting errors in the Duke’s Bank
application. Our two new techniques (intelligent sampling and HMM-based state vector
reduction) have been integrated in Monitor for the experiments.
6.1 Adjusting the Sampling Rate
When experiencing high incoming rates, Monitor starts sampling messages in order
to avoid being overwhelmed. This is because after a certain incoming rate the latency in
matching rules increases linearly from milliseconds to minutes and we would like the
Monitor to operate at a rate less than where this linear increase starts. We call this point
Monitor’s threshold rate and denote it as Rth. We observe this threshold in Monitor when
WebStressor emulates about 3 concurrent users in Duke’s Bank application. Therefore,
for the rest of this discussion we select the threshold as 3 concurrent users. We measured
the average of incoming messages in Monitor for this threshold to be 52 messages/sec so
we assign this value to Rth.
Sampling rate Rs in Monitor is adjusted by the formula:
Rs = 1 −

( R − Rth )
,
R

R > Rth ,

where R is the incoming rate.
The performance of the intelligent sampling algorithm is directly affected by the
calculated sampling rate. The intelligent sampling algorithm samples n messages in a
window of m messages. Therefore, Monitor needs a fraction n/m that approximates Rs.
We call this fraction the sampling factor. Depending on the value of m used in Monitor,
we can have a discretization error > 0. For example, if m = 8, and Rs = 0.741, the best
factor Monitor can select is 6/8 = 0.75 which has a discretization error of 0.009.
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Table 6.1
Sampling Factors calculated according to the number of messages per sec. received.

4
8
Messages / sec.
70.00 118.97
Sampling rate
0.741 0.436
Sampling factor
6/8
4/8
Discretization error 0.01
0.06

Concurrent Users
12
16
20
24
194.28 236.86 314.38 362.74
0.267 0.219 0.165 0.143
2/8
2/8
1/8
1/8
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.02

The selection of m in the sampling factor is a critical step since it affects the
performance of intelligent sampling algorithm. If m is greater than the size of a web
interaction, intelligent sampling algorithm can drop all the messages in the web
interaction. This can increase missed alarms because a fault injected in this web
interaction will not be detected in Monitor. Therefore in terms of the rate of missed
alarms, the ideal value for m should be the size of the smallest web interaction. We
observe in the Duke’s Bank application that the smallest size is 6, however we consider
this a very small size for m because the discretization error when translating Rs to the
sampling factor can be considerable. In order to avoid assigning a value to m much larger
than 6 and that help us in managing a reasonable discretization error, we assign 8 to m for
the rest of the experiments. Table 6.1 shows values for the sampling according to the
incoming message rate, the best sampling factor and its corresponding discretization
error. For the rest of the experiments, for each number of concurrent users shown in
Table 6.1, we fix the corresponding sampling factor in Monitor.
6.2 State Vector Reduction
We now run experiments to confirm pragmatically our hypothesis that intelligent
sampling algorithm helps in reducing the size of the state vector ω. For this, we run
WebStressor with a fixed moderate user load (8 concurrent users) and with no error
injection. This load obligates Monitor to use a sampling rate of 50%, which we believe it
is reasonable for assessing the sampling algorithms capabilities. This is run two times;
one with Monitor configured in random sampling (RS) mode, and one configured in
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intelligent sampling (IS) mode. We then observe ω in the StateMaintainer engine in
Monitor. The vector ω changes when a message is sampled as well as when a message is
dropped. When a message is dropped, ω increases or stays constant. When a message is
sampled, ω is pruned and it is passed to the RuleMatching engine for possible detection.
In each run, we obtained abut 3337 values of ω’s size. Fig. 6.1 shows 100-samples
snapshots of these values for RS and IS modes (the size of ω is shown for every message
here.)
The high-peaks pattern that we observe in RS mode in Fig. 6.1 is due to the
deficiency of random sampling in selecting messages with small discriminative size.
Recall that, these messages have the desired property that they appear in one (or few)
transitions in the FSM. In contrast we do not observe this pattern in IS mode, because it
takes advantage of sampling most of these messages, allowing the StateMaintainer to
produce smaller pruned state vectors ω. We notice that, in RS mode, ω’s size can reach
31 which is the number of states in the FSM, whereas in IS mode, ω’s size is bound to
around 14. Also, ω’s size can increase even when sampling is being done, but this
happens less often with intelligent sampling due to its ability to sample suitable
messages.
We observe in Fig. 6.1 that, for IS mode, ω’s size is sometimes kept 1 consecutively
for 4 times. We can observe the occurrence of this pattern one time in the range of
samples 100−120, and two times in the range of samples 120−140 in Fig. 6.1. The reason
for this is that in the Duke’s Bank application’s FSM, the most frequent discriminative
size, within the 62 types of messages, is 1. Therefore, as the intelligent sampling
algorithm tries to sample these messages as much as it can, it is very likely that we
observe such a pattern in ω. IS mode helps then in maintaining a ω’s size of 1; our
ultimate goal⎯regardless of the sampling algorithm, ideally ω should be of size 1 since
the application can only be in one state. For RS on the other hand, the troughs are shortlived.
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Fig. 6.1. Snapshot of 100 sampled values of the state vector in random sampling (RS)
mode and intelligent sampling mode (IS) mode
We now measure only ω’s size after it is pruned. Recall that the pruned state vector ω
is the one used for rule instantiation and matching in the RuleMatching engine.
Therefore, it is at this point in time that we more desire a reduction of ω for Monitor’s
improvement in detection accuracy and precision. Fig. 6.3 shows a cumulative
distribution function (CDF) for the observed values of ω’s size. As we expected, in IS
mode, ω’s size of 1 has a higher frequency of occurrence (about 83%) than in RS mode
(60%). Thus, in IS mode, ω contains only one state most of the time. In contrast, all ω’s
size values > 1 have higher frequency of occurrence in RS than in IS. We observe as well
that ω, after being pruned, can have a maximum size of 7. This is because of the nature of
Duke’s Bank application in which the maximum message’s discriminative size is 7.
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Fig. 6.2. Average size of the state vector over the run of an experiment
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Fig. 6.3. Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) for the pruned state vector with RS and
IS
We vary the concurrent number of users in WebStressor order to observe the average
ω’s size under various loads imposed to Monitor. Fig. 6.2 presents the ω’s average size
for different numbers of concurrent users. Notice that, in average, the ω’s size does not
change considerably by varying the load charged to Monitor, neither for RS nor for IS
mode.
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One interesting observation is that the difference in ω’s average size for RS and IS
mode is small (in the order of 2 states) if we consider the total amount of states in our
FSM, which is 31. Nevertheless, the cost of having a ω’s size > 1 can be high in terms of
computation and false alarms. First, if Monitor is fed with a base of complex rules, the
tasks to be performed for matching them can be computationally intensive. For example,
a rule can validate the consistency of data through different tables in a database. If an
entry in a table is deleted, a consistency check has to be performed that all associated
entries have been garbage collected, which can consume significant resources. Because
the number of rules to be matched in Monitor is directly proportional to the number of
states in ω, even a small reduction in ω’s size can significantly reduce the computational
cost in Monitor’s RuleMatching engine. Second, and perhaps more importantly, a
reduction of ω’s size can reduce substantially the rate of false alarms⎯if we consider the
worst case whereby all the N rules in Monitor are matched for any state, a reduction of N
false alarms can be achieved, if ω’s size is reduced by 1.
6.3 Definition of Performance Metrics
We introduce the metrics that we use to evaluate the Monitor’s performance in
detecting failures in web interactions. We use these metrics as well to compare the
performance of Convolution and Pinpoint-PCFG to the one observed in Monitor.
Let W denote the set of web interactions generated in the application when a load of
concurrent users is imposed. Recall that we are able to identify web interactions with a
key as they start and finish in the application server. For every run of an experiment, we
collect W and the following variables:
• I: out of W, the web interactions where faults were injected,
• D: out of W, the web interactions in which Monitor detected a failure,
• C: out of I, the web interactions in which Monitor detected a failure (these are the
actual correct detections made by Monitor).
We define Accuracy as | C | / | I | and Precision as | C | / | D |, where | C |, | I | and | D |
denote the number of web interactions in C, I and D respectively. In one hand, accuracy
expresses how well the detection system is able to identify the web interactions in which
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problems occurred, while in the other hand, precision is a measure of the inverse of false
alarms in the system.
An important performance metric of a detection system is the latency of detecting
failures. Let Ti (time of injection) denote the time when a fault is injected. Also let Td
(time of detection) denote the time when the failure caused by a fault injected at Ti is
detected in the detection system. We define detection latency as Td – Ti. In the case when
a delay δ is injected—emulating a performance problem in a component of the
application—δ is subtracted from the total time, that is, detection latency = Td – Ti – δ.
The reason δ is subtracted is that δ represents only a characteristic of the injected fault
and does not reflect the level of performance of the detection system.
It may be useful to identify a problem in a web interaction even before the web
interaction finishes. For example, if during the sequence of calls between components in
a web interaction, we detect a problem in a subcomponent, we may want to prevent
subsequent subcomponents to be called. This can help in preventing the propagation of
error to subsequent subcomponents and in diagnosing the root cause of the problem. In
each experiment, we measure the time when a web interaction finishes and denote it as
Ts. If the interval of time Td – Ts is < 0, we say that the detection system had a predetection latency of | Td – Ts |, whereas if the interval of time Td – Ts is ≥ 0, we say that
the detection system had post-detection latency of Td – Ts. In Convolution and PinpointPCFG, a complete web interaction has to be observed to perform error detection, while in
Monitor detection is performed without looking at the entire web interaction. Therefore,
Convolution and Pinpoint-PCFG always have post-detection, while Monitor may have
pre- or post-detection.
6.4 Error Injection Model
Errors are injected into the application traces to test the performance of the three
compared detection systems. Faults are injected by WebStressor at runtime when
mimicking concurrent users.
We inject four kinds of errors that occur in real operating scenarios:
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1. Response delay: a delay d is selected randomly between 500 msec and 750 msec,
and is injected in a particular subcomponent. This error simulates subcomponent’s
response delays due to performance problems.
2. Null Calls: a called subcomponent is never executed. This error makes the web
interaction get cut short and the client receives a generic error report, e.g., HTTP
500 internal server error.
3. Runtime Exception: this simulates undeclared exceptions, and declared exceptions
that are not masked by the application. As in null calls the web interaction gets cut
short and the client receives an error report.
4. Incorrect Message Sequences: this simulates an error that occurs in the application
and for which there is an exception handler. The exception handler either continues
with the current web interaction as is, or it changes the structure of the web
interaction (e.g., by calling a different subcomponent). We change the structure of a
web interaction by replacing the calls and returns in N consecutive subcomponents.
The value of N is selected randomly between 1 and 5.
Of these kinds of injections, Convolution can only detect response delay, while PinpointPCFG can only detect null calls, runtime exceptions and incorrect message sequences.
Therefore, we carry out two separate set of experiments to compare Monitor’s
performance to Convolution and to Pinpoint-PCFG. The results of these experiments are
shown in the next two sub-sections.
6.5 Detecting Performance Problems: Injection of Response Delays
In this subsection, we explain our evaluation of Monitor and Convolution in detecting
performance problems in web interactions. We inject delays to simulate performance
problems in the set of 5 components listed in Table 6.2.
A category of errors that is one of the most difficult to detect is transient errors—
those that are caused by unpredictable random events and that are difficult to reproduce
and isolate. We want to test Monitor in detecting this category of errors. In order to
mimic this scenario in our injection strategy, we inject delays only 20% of the time any
subcomponent in Table 6.2 is touched in a web interaction.
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Table 6.2
List of subcomponents (component, method) in which performance delays are injected
Name
AccountControllerBean
TxControllerBean
/template/banner.jsp
/bank/accountList.faces
/logon.jsp

Method
createNamedQuery
deposit
JspServlet.service
FacesServlet.service
JspServlet.service

(k=1, Low Load)

(k=1, High Load)

1

1
80% rules

Accuracy

Type of Component
EJB
EJB
servlet
servlet
servlet

80% rules

60% rules
40% rules

60% rules
0.5

40% rules

0.5

20% rules

20% rules
0

0

0.5
1 - Precision
(k=2, Low Load)

1

1

0

0.5
1 - Precision
(k=2, High Load)

1

1
80% rules

Accuracy

0

80% rules

60% rules
40% rules

60% rules
0.5

0.5

20% rules

40% rules

20% rules
0

0

0.5
1 - Precision

1

0

0

0.5
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1

Fig. 6.4. ROC curves generated by varying the % of rules and parameter k in Monitor.
Error bars show 95% of confidence intervals.
Before running the experiment, we determine the best operational parameters’ set in
Monitor and Convolution, that is, those that produce the best results in terms of accuracy
and precision. For this we generate ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic) curves for
Monitor and Convolution by varying their configuration parameters and the imposed load
of users to the application. We use two kinds of loads: low load, that is 4 concurrent
users, and high load, that is 20 concurrent users. Once the ROC curves are generated, we
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select a point in the curves according to the following common criteria (we call this point
as operational point):
(a) Select the closest point to the ideal point, that is (0, 1). If more than one point
fulfills this criterion, evaluate the next one.
(b) Select the point that has the best precision. If more than one point fulfills this
criterion, the choice of the best operational point is left to the system
administrator.
In Monitor, we vary two parameters: the size of the rulebase and k, an input to the
HMM-based state vector reduction algorithm. Rulebase size is varied by activating
randomly into Monitor only 20%, 40%, 60% or 80% of the exhaustive list of rules, while
parameter k is varied over 1 and 2. The reason we do not vary k over values > 2 is that
Monitor’s HMM is not likely to help in detecting delays. Fig. 6.4 shows the ROC curves.
We can observe that increasing the % of rules increases the accuracy both in low and
high load, while we do not observe a consistent pattern in the variation of precision. Also
it is noticeable that the variation of k does not affect considerably the dispersion of the
points in the two ROC curves. According to our criteria, we finally select as Monitor’s
best configuration parameters a rulebase size of 80%, and k = 2. This corresponds to the
point closest to (0,1) in the first plot in Fig. 6.4.
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Fig. 6.5. Accuracy and Precision for Monitor and Convolution. Error bars show 95% of
confidence intervals.
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Fig. 6.6. Monitor’s detection latency when detecting performance delays. Error bars show
95% of confidence intervals.
Delays injection experiment is run once operational points are selected for the two
systems. Fig. 6.5 shows the results of this experiment. In Monitor, we observe a decrease
in its accuracy of about 5% as concurrent users are increased from 4 to 16, and an
increase in the same order of magnitude as users are increased to 24. The reason of the
increase in accuracy is due to the precision rate that decreases rapidly after 16 concurrent
users. Because of the large rate of false alarms generated after this point, accuracy is
increased as a traded-off. The decrease in precision is explained by how aggressive the
rules are in Monitor. When the application is stressed with a high load, component’s
response time increases naturally, making Monitor to flag more false alarms. We can
relax the rules by enlarging the amount of delay considered as normal for components,
which would maintain a precision of 1 even when the application is exposed to higher
loads. However, this can reduce accuracy since Monitor may not be able to detect a delay
smaller than this bound.
Fig. 6.6 shows the results for the detection latency observed in Monitor. In average,
detection latency is kept constant by Monitor. This is the direct effect of (1) adjusting the
sampling rate in Monitor for different incoming messages rates and (2) the efficiency in
the intelligent sampling algorithm in reducing the state vector size. Notice that if Monitor
uses random sampling for this experiment, the same pattern would have been observed,
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but with a higher average. This is because the sampling rate in any sampling approach is
selected so that it allows detection latency be adjusted to a required value.
6.6 Detecting Anomalous Web Interactions
We evaluate Monitor detection’s performance in detecting anomalous web
interactions by injecting null calls, runtime exceptions and incorrect message sequences.
As in the delay injections, performance is evaluated by measuring accuracy, precision
and detection latency. We also evaluate Pinpoint-PCFG’s performance with the same
categories of injections.
Monitor detects anomalous web interactions at the state maintainer by verifying the
correct transitions in the FSM. If an event is unexpected according to the current state in
Monitor’s state vector, an error is flagged. This avoids the need for rules for this type of
detections. All the detections by Monitor will point out the actual injections, as Monitor
is verifying messages according to its FSM. Therefore we will have a precision of one at
Monitor for this kind of injections. We show Fig. 6.7 rather than a ROC curve.
Under sampling, Monitor can drop an incorrect message, thus reducing accuracy. We
show that in practice, our hypothesis that HMM is useful for detecting anomalous web
interactions holds. Fig. 6.7 shows Monitor running with different values of k in the HMM
algorithm. Parameter k=0 represents Monitor running without HMM. We can observe
that, with no HMM, in both low and high load, accuracy is very low (about 0.4). For k=2
in low load and k=1 in high load, accuracy reaches its highest value. We observe that as
we vary k, for low load accuracy remains almost the same (0.9), whereas it decreases
substantially in high load (reaching a minimum of about 0.55).
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Fig. 6.7. Monitor’s accuracy when varying parameter k in the HMM-based state vector
reduction algorithm
In high load, two conditions cause Monitor to have a decreasing accuracy when
increasing k: (1) The Monitor samples less often leading to an increase in the state vector
size. With a large k, few states will get pruned and if the observed erroneous message is
possible in any of the remaining states of the state vector, the error will not be detected.
(2) Increasing k effectively reduces the impact of the HMM, since even states with low
probabilities given by the HMM are being considered. Under high load, when the
erroneous message may not be sampled, the HMM is particularly important. Therefore,
under high load a high value of k is not a good option for Monitor. For the rest of the
experiments, we use k=1 as it allows Monitor to have good accuracy in both low and high
load.
We vary the threshold Mth (a parameter of Pinpoint-PCFG) to get Pinpoint-PCFG’s
ROC curves under low and high load. Fig. 6.8 shows the results of this experiment. A
lower value of threshold generates more false positives as opposed to a higher one. A too
high value would on the other hand generate missed alarms. We select Mth = 350 in the
ROC curves as the operating point based on the same criteria as in section 6.5.
We observe that on average, Monitor’s accuracy is comparable to Pinpoint-PCFG. In
Monitor, accuracy decreases for higher load due to dropping more messages in a
sampling widow. We see the robustness of Pinpoint-PCFG to false positives as it
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maintains on average almost the same precision with increasing number of users (0.9). As
can be see in Fig. 6.9(b), precision line in Pinpoint-PCFG can shift up or down—this can
vary in the PCFG based on the degree of training.
A trained PCFG represents a superset of the observed web interactions in our system.
Therefore, PCFG can actually match some patterns that were not seen in the training
phase. Still there will be some patterns that are normal but because they were not seen in
the training phase, generate a false alarm.
We observe a mean accuracy value of 0.9 in Fig. 6.9(a) even with increasing number
of users. As the load increases, Pinpoint-PCFG maintains a high accuracy because it is
not dropping messages—messages are being enqueued for processing eventually.
However the latency of detection suffers significantly at these high loads as seen in Fig.
6.10(b)—latency in Pinpoint-PCFG is in the order of seconds while in Monitor is in the
order of milliseconds. Note that Monitor performs better on precision and maintains a
close accuracy to Pinpoint-PCFG even with dropping of messages.
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Fig. 6.8. ROC curve for PCFG. Points are generated by varying the Threshold Mth. Error
bars show 95% of confidence intervals.
Detection latency in Monitor is dependent on how fast the state vector is pruned after
sampling a message. The complexity of pruning is O(N2), where N is the number of states
which is 31 in the FSM. Monitor is able to detect before a particular web interaction ends.
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Table 6.3 shows the percentages of pre and post-detection delay for Monitor as we
increase concurrent users. We observe that Monitor has a pre-detection latency that can
vary from 8.93% to 22.67%.
The Pinpoint-PCFG’s detection latency in the order of seconds can be explained by
the time and space complexity of the parsing algorithm in the PCFG. Complexity of the
recognition algorithm is O(L3) and space complexity is O(RL2), where R is the number of
rules in the grammar and L is the size of a web interaction. In the Duke’s Bank
application we observe that the maximum length of a web interaction is 256, and that the
weighted average size is 70. Previous work with PCFGs [17] has also shown that,
average time to parse sentences of length 40 can easily take 120 seconds even under
optimized parameters scenarios.
Another cause of the high latency in our Pinpoint-PCFG implementation is the large
amount of virtual memory that the process is taken. Due to its space complexity,
Pinpoint-PCFG process consumes a large amount of virtual memory as can be seen in
Table 6.4 in our memory consumption experiments (933.56 MB for a load of 24
concurrent users in the application). This makes Pinpoint-PCFG process to thrash in the
machine where we conducted our experiments—a Linux box with 4 processors
(3.40GHz) and 1024 MB of RAM.
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Fig. 6.9. Accuracy and Precision for Monitor and Pinpoint-PCFG. Error bars show 95%
of confidence intervals.
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Fig. 6.10. Detection latency for Monitor and Pinpoint-PCFG. Error bars show 95% of
confidence intervals.
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Table 6.3
Pre and Post detection delay for Monitor when detecting incorrect messages in web
interactions
Type of Latency (%)
Pre-Detection
Post-Detection

4

8

15.38
84.62

8.93
91.07

Concurrent Users
12
16
22.67
77.33

15.24
84.76

20

24

11.50
88.50

9.86
90.14

6.7 Random and Intelligent Sampling Comparison
We evaluate the performance of random and sampling in detecting performance
delays. Since intelligent sampling allows Monitor to reduce the state vector, it is expected
the number of rules that are matched in is less than in random sampling, therefore
affecting the accuracy and precision directly.
For this experiment, we use similar definitions for accuracy and precision as in the
previous experiments, but we changed the granularity of detection from web interactions
to subcomponents. Since the difference between intelligent and random sampling is
reflected mainly in the number of instantiated and matched rules at runtime, we want a
definition that permit us evaluate this difference fairly. For this experiment, let W denote
the set of subcomponents where faults are injected in the application. Variables I, D and
C are now defined as:
• I: out of W, the subcomponents where faults were injected,
• D: out of W, the subcomponents in which Monitor detected a failure,
• C: out of I, the subcomponents in which Monitor detected a failure
Accuracy and Precision formulas are the same than in subsection 6.3. Notice that this
definition measure Monitor’s performance in detecting errors at the subcomponents level.
Detection at this level is helpful in diagnosis—finding the root cause of the problem—
because it helps in reducing the set of subcomponents to look for the cause of the
problem. Even when an error is pinpointed in a different subcomponent, a diagnosis
scheme does not have to look for the problem in the set of all the subcomponents but in a
reduced one.
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Fig. 6.11. Accuracy and Pecision for Random Sampling (RS) and Intelligent Sampling
(IS).
We vary the number of concurrent users as in previous experiments, and measure
accuracy and precision in Monitor running in random sampling and intelligent sampling
separately. Delays are injected in the same subcomponents used in subsection 6.5 Fig.
6.11 shows the results of the experiment. We observe that accuracy and precision is
higher for IS for almost all the application’s loads; 4, 8, 12 and 16 concurrent users.
However, for high loads, that is 20 and 24 concurrent users, random and intelligent
sampling exhibit almost the same performance. The reason for this is that our definition
does not allow us to measure whether detections in subcomponents in the set C are 100%
correct. Due to the dropping nature inherent in both intelligent and random sampling,
delays can be seen and detected in states where no error was injected. Since
subcomponents are treated as states in our FSM, this causes high rates of false alarms at
the subcomponent level. This leads to non-reliable accuracy measurements for high loads
when this situation is highly exposed. If we were able to measure correct detections—
elements in set C— at finer granular level, intelligent sampling would show better
performance in the graphs even in high loads.
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6.8 Memory Consumption
To see the highest amount of memory that our implementations were consuming, we
measure average memory consumption for Monitor, Convolution and Pinpoint-PCFG
under a load of 24 concurrent users. Memory consumption is collected every 5 seconds
by reading the /proc filesystem in our Linux boxes (4 3.40GHz processors and 1024
MB of RAM) and averaged out the total duration of each experimental run. We measure
the virtual memory size (VmSize) and the number of pages the process has in real
memory (VmRSS) which we call memory in RAM.
The configuration parameters for each system are:
• Monitor: k=2 and 80% of the rules
• Pinpoint-PCFG: Threshold Mth=350
• Convolution: (implementation still in progress)
Table 6.4 shows the results of this experiment.
Table 6.4
Memory consumption for the three compared systems (Monitor, Pinpoint-PCFG and
Convolution)

Monitor
Convolution
Pinpoint-PCFG

Average Memory Usage (MB)
Virtual Memory
Memory in RAM
282.27
25.53
⎯
⎯
933.56
696.06

Monitor does not require storing large data structures at runtime that is the reason we
see smaller values of average virtual memory and memory in RAM as compared to
Convolution and Pinpoint-PCFG. However, Pinpoint-PCFG recognition algorithm’s high
space complexity O(RL2) along with time complexity of O(L3) results in the high memory
consumption as seen in Table 6.4. The Cocke-Younger-Kasami (CYK) algorithm, the
parsing algorithm used in the implementation, requires storing and updating the
probabilities in a three-dimensional array for each web-interaction encountered. Due to
the large average sizes of web interactions (in terms of the number of messages) seeing at
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runtime, the virtual memory consumption on average is in the order of 933 MB. Since the
implementation of Convolution is still in progress, we do not present its memory
consumption results in this work.
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7.

RELATED WORK

7.1 Error Detection in Distributed Systems
Previous approaches to detection in distributed systems have varied from heartbeats
to watchdogs [18][19][20]. However, these designs have looked at a restricted set of
errors (such as, livelocks) as compared to our work, or depended on alerts from the
monitored components.
A recent work that is more related to ours is Pinpoint [4]. Authors in [4] present an
approach for tracing paths from user requests and propose the use of statistical analysis
techniques to detect and diagnose failures in large distributed systems. Particularly, a
Probabilistic Context Free Grammar (PCFG) is used to model normal path behavior, that
is, to model the likelihood of a given path occurring based on the paths seen during a
training phase. A path’s structure is then considered anomalous if it significantly deviates
from a pattern that can be derived from the PCFG. Authors claim that their techniques
can be used to detect structural changes in paths as well as performance anomalies, for
example, when a non-responsive or sluggish component stalls a path. Pinpoint does not
consider the problem of dealing with high rates of requests. In contrast, in our work we
propose sampling approaches to cope with high rates of incoming data. We believe that
the detection system’s performance should not suffer abruptly because of high loads—
rates of missed and false alarms, and delay in detecting failures should not go below an
acceptable level.
7.2 Performance Modeling and Debugging
There is an increase of work in providing tools for debugging problems in distributed
applications—Project5 [1][21] and Magpie[2][3]. The general flavor of the approaches is
that tools collect trace information at different levels of granularity which are used for
automatic analysis, often offline, to determine the possible root causes of the problem.
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For example, Project5’s main goal is detecting performance delays on distributed
systems. In [1] models for performance delays on RPC-style and message-based
application for LAN environments are proposed—authors focus on finding high latency
causal path patterns. Authors propose a nesting algorithm that examines a global system
trace and establishes relationships of nested calls between components in the system. A
second algorithm, convolution algorithm, separates the system trace as per function call
trace, and models the delays at each component based on signal processing techniques.
Convolution algorithm applies to both types of applications—RPC-style and messagebased applications. In [21] authors present a third algorithm for performance debugging
in wide-area systems. The algorithm, called message linking algorithm, models causal
path structure and its timing in wide-area systems by taking into account network latency.
The Magpie project [2][3] is complementary to our work—it is a tool that helps in
understanding system behavior for the purposes of performance analysis and debugging
in distributed applications. Magpie collects CPU usage and disk access for user requests
as they travel though the system components. This is performed by the use of Event
Tracing, a logging infrastructure built for the Windows operating system. It then
constructs workload models that discard the scheduling artifacts due to OS multitasking,
timesharing and caching. These models can be used for capacity planning, performance
debugging and anomaly detection. We believe that Magpie is complimentary to our work,
because workload models of request behavior could be used in Monitor to specify rules
aimed in the detection of anomalies and performance bottlenecks.
Other powerful tools have also been proposed recently. For example, in [19] authors
present a tool called liblog that aids in recreating the events that occurred prior to and
during failure. The replay can be done offline at a different site. The tool guarantees that
the event state in its log will be consistent, that is, no message is received before it has
been sent.
7.3 Stateful Detection in High Throughput
In the area of intrusion detection, techniques have been proposed to allow networkbased intrusion detection systems (NIDS) to keep up with high network bandwidths. For
example, [22] proposes a partitioning approach of the network traffic to make the stateful
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analysis manageable by a NIDS in high-speed links. The idea in [22] is to divide the
traffic volume in smaller portions for different devices (sensors), in such a way that
guarantees the detection of all the attack scenarios. Another approach is increasing the
efficiency of the detection pattern-matching algorithms (e.g., [23]). This research work
differs from ours in two aspects. First, although distributing the detection load in multiple
machines helps, this does not solve the fundamental problem of how to manage the
resource usage in individual machines. In our work, we want to address the issue of
making the detection task manageable first at the level of single machines, which will
allow any detection infrastructure scale up. Second, they look for problems at the
network level by the use of misuse rules. Our work looks at application level deviations
from expected behavior.
7.4 Sampling Techniques for Anomaly Detection
Recently there is an increased effort in finding network failures, anomalies and
attacks through changes in high-speed network links. For example, [24] proposes a
sketch-based approach, where a sketch is a set of hash tables that models data as a series
of (key, value) pairs; key can be a source/destination IP address (or pair of addresses),
and the value can be the number of bytes or packets. A sketch can indicate if any given
key exhibits large changes, and can provide accurate probabilistic estimates of the
changes. Authors in [24] build a forecast model for the changes in rates of different kinds
of network packets. Sampling techniques has also been used in high-speed links as input
for anomaly detection [25][26], for example, for detecting denial-of-service (DoS) attacks
or worm scans, while some studies show that these sampling techniques introduce
fundamental bias that depredates performance when detecting network anomalies (e.g., in
[27]). Our work differs from those studies fundamentally because we focus on detection
of failures at the application level rather than only at the network layer, and because we
perform stateful detection by applying rules to states in the monitored application.
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8.

CONCLUSIONS

In this work, we have tackled the problem of state non-determinism in Monitor (our
failure detection system) caused by sampling messages when performing stateful
detection in distributed applications. An intelligent sampling algorithm has been
incorporated in Monitor to select particular messages so that non-determinism is
minimized, and its accuracy and precision in detection is increased as compared to
randomly selecting the messages. In addition, an HMM-based technique has been
incorporated in Monitor to determine the most likely application’s state(s) so that rule
matching is applied to only those states. We use the Duke’s Bank application as a sample
of a distributed application in which errors are injected and detected while imposing a
load of concurrent users.
We have shown that the reduction of the state vector caused by the intelligent
sampling approach has a direct effect in Monitor’s performance; accuracy and precision
in detecting performance problems in application’s subcomponents, and in detecting
anomalous web interaction, is comparable or superior to other state-of-the-art detection
systems: Convolution and Pinpoint. Also, our HMM-based technique has shown to be
effective in making Monitor robust in detecting faulty web interactions. For example,
accuracy in Monitor when detecting anomalies in the structure of web interactions is
similar to Pinpoint (about 0.8), while Monitor’s precision is superior (it is 1.0 as
compared to an average of 0.9 in Pinpoint).
In detection latency, Monitor outperforms the other two systems. For example, in
detecting anomalies in web interactions, Monitor provides detection latency in the order
of milliseconds, while Pinpoint performs detection in the order of seconds. This
considerable difference is due to the fact that Monitor sample messages to reduce its
workload while maintaining a high level of accuracy and precision; however, Pinpoint
does not sample, thus it analyses every message in all the observed web interactions. We
do not present results of detection latency for Convolution because its implementation is
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still in progress; nevertheless, we expect Convolution’s detection latency to be higher
than Monitor because, as Pinpoint, Convolution does not sample messages.
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